Beyond the false choice between the Islamic Republic and a return to monarchy, a largely ignored political current in Iran rejects both “crown” and “turban.” Rooted in grassroots movements, marginalised communities, and queer-feminist and antifascist struggles, this perspective challenges both domestic repression and Western media narratives that erase Iran’s political diversity. In this interview with etos.media, two Iranian diaspora activists outline this overlooked “third force”.
War, decades of rule under a radical theocratic dictatorship, and a long history of repression under the monarchy have left generations of Iranians exhausted and yearning for freedoms they have rarely known. For many observers, Iran’s political future is often framed as a choice between two deeply flawed options: the current theocratic regime and a possible return to the authoritarian monarchists. Nevertheless. Many Iranians reject this binary. They argue that a “crown” should not be the only alternative to a “turban.” We sat down with two Iranian activists to discuss the country’s political reality and respond to critical questions which are often avoided—or oversimplified—in mainstream debates.
Author’s Note:
For their own safety, both names used in this interview are pseudonyms chosen by the participants to protect their identities. “Afsaneh” refers to an Iranian currently residing in Germany. “Bahamad” represents a politically active group of Iranian exiles with which our second guest has been involved for several years.
etos.media: Many people in Germany tend to view Iran’s political landscape as largely defined by a binary divide between supporters of the current theocratic regime and monarchists. How would you respond to those who interpret Iran’s political reality in these terms?
Bahamad: The dichotomy Islamic Republic vs. monarchy is a media construct that attempts to suppress the diversity and ethnic plurality of Iranian society. Iran is not a “homogeneous” country; more than half of the population consists of non-Persian nationalities (Kurds, Baloch, Arabs, Turks, Lurs, Turkmen, and others), who have suffered for decades under the dual oppression of a centralist system—whether religiously driven or monarchical.
It is of crucial importance to understand that the revolution known to the world under the name “Woman, Life, Freedom” derived its true legitimacy and its original impulse from the resistance of the periphery against the centre. This movement began with the state killing of Jina (Mahsa) Amini, a young woman who was subjected to a double oppression because of her “being a woman” and her “being Kurdish.” The slogan “Jin, Jiyan, Azadî,” which has its roots in the liberation struggles of Kurdistan, shows that the driving force for change in Iran comes from marginalised bodies—ethnically, gender-wise, and socially.
From the perspective of a queer-feminist Antifa, the project of “monarchy” is nothing more than a return to a totalitarian nationalism that suppresses diverse identities under the fetish of “one nation, one language, one king.”
Afsaneh: The Islamic Republic of Iran established its power by systematically removing and terrorising all other political parties. It did not matter who they were or where they came from; the regime eliminated anyone who opposed them, including those who had originally helped them win the Revolution. Because of this, it is now difficult to find any surviving political parties, neither inside nor outside of Iran. Through a „chain of terror“ both at home and abroad, any small opposition groups were immediately dismantled or killed. Of course, freedom of speech did not exist under the monarchy either. Both of these powers throughout Iranian history destroyed their rivals, leaving them as two dominant sides today. Other political parties remain too small to be known by the West or even by the new generation in Iran. Without money or a platform to develop an opposition, they cannot grow.
etos.media: At the same time, a significant media campaign in the West has portrayed the son of Iran’s former Shah as a potential alternative for the country’s future. Some observers here consider him a realistic political option for Iranians—an assumption that may reflect limited familiarity with Iran’s political history and the diversity of its opposition. How would you respond to those who hold this view?
Bahamad: The promotion of the Shah’s son in Western media represents an attempt at a “media coup” and a “regime change” from above, which deliberately ignores the essential demands of oppressed ethnic groups as well as sexual and gender minorities. The reality of Iran reveals itself in the streets of Zahedan and Sanandaj, in local committees and in the resistance of those who want neither a return to the past (monarchy) nor the continuation of the status quo; they demand a complete decentralisation of power and the abolition of all hierarchies.
etos.media: Iran’s history under the monarchy is often associated with the suppression of political opposition and the activities of the notorious secret police, SAVAK. Critics argue that the agency was responsible for widespread surveillance, arbitrary arrests, and the torture of political dissidents in order to safeguard the regime. Could you describe the political climate in Iran under the monarchy, and explain how repression and the lack of political freedoms shaped both opposition movements and everyday life for ordinary citizens?
Bahamad: The monarchy in Iran—contrary to the romanticised image often portrayed by right-wing media—was an era of systematic repression and deep social inequality, and never constituted a democratic institution. SAVAK (acronym for “Bureau for Intelligence and Security of the State”, N.K.) was not merely a secret police force, but an instrument for stabilising a “unified, obedient body” under the authority of the “father of the nation.” The organised suppression of leftist and progressive forces created precisely the political conditions that ultimately facilitated the rise of religious groups. From a feminist perspective, monarchy represents the reproduction of the structure “Shah–Father–God,” in which neither feminism nor the existence of queer bodies has any place.
It is also important to note that the repression of that time was not directed only against “leftists” or “intellectuals.” Rather, Iranian society as a whole was shaped by a structure that distinguished between “insiders” and “outsiders.” The Pahlavi family and their close circle of influential confidants concentrated a large share of the national wealth in their hands through extensive practices and economic corruption. They effectively stood above the law and bent it to serve their familial and class interests, while a large part of the population lived in poverty and was deprived of basic social and political rights. More than half of the population was kept in illiteracy.
Ultimately, it was political repression and the absence of civil and political freedoms for the broader population, as well as for oppressed groups, that drove society toward the explosion of 1979 and the seizure of power by religious forces. Current monarchism continues this logic of the “exclusion of the other” and reproduces the same patterns of familial nepotism. The supporters of this patriarchal and corrupt structure block every form of independent political work.
At gatherings abroad, supporters of Reza Pahlavi sometimes demonstratively carry SAVAK flags and refer to themselves as “Savakis.” This points to an openly authoritarian and repressive political attitude—even before reaching power. The public display of a symbol of an organisation responsible for the torture and killing of political opponents constitutes a serious warning sign for any antifascist movement: It is not about democracy for them, but about the revival of the same machinery of oppression.
etos.media: Much of the visible support for Reza Pahlavi appears to come from segments of the Iranian diaspora rather than from within Iran itself. Some critics argue that parts of this diaspora express support for foreign pressure—or even military action—against the Iranian government, despite the potential consequences for ordinary people inside the country. How do you interpret this phenomenon? And how significant is the level of support for Reza Pahlavi and monarchist politics inside Iran compared with the visibility of such support within the Iranian diaspora abroad?
Bahamad: The analysis of the political weight of the Monarchists requires a clear distinction between propaganda abroad and the reality on the ground in Iran:
Monarchy as a media product Outside Iran, major Persian-language media outlets (such as Iran International), financed through opaque budgets and petrodollars, present a “sanitised” and artificially secularised version of the Pahlavi era. This image resembles more of a TV show than a real political movement. History is deliberately distorted in order to present the monarchy as the only possible alternative.
Aggressive nationalism and diaspora fascism A portion of the diaspora, living for decades away from the social reality in the country, the effects of sanctions, and the existential economic burdens in Iran, has turned toward radical nationalism and authoritarian ideologies. Instead of relying on the self-empowerment of the population, they turned to the current hopes of military intervention and war. From an antifascist perspective, this “desire for war” represents the peak of an inhuman attitude and points to the deeply undemocratic nature of a movement that seeks to come to power on the ruins of a country.
The actual weight within the country – the periphery versus the centre Within Iran, slogans referring to the Pahlavis can occasionally be heard; however, these are mostly expressions of emotional reactions to hopelessness and the lack of clear perspectives for political change. In contrast, the central and progressive forces—including teachers’ movements, workers’ protests, and the movements of oppressed nationalities in Kurdistan and Balochistan—do not wish to return to the past. The core of the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement demands social justice, decentralisation of political power, and the rejection of any form of dictatorship—whether a theocracy or a monarchy. Among the organised and progressive forces inside Iran, monarchist groups hold no hegemonic position.
etos.media: In the context of the Israeli genocide on Gaza, some Iranians, particularly parts of the diaspora, have publicly expressed support for Israel mainly as a reaction against the Iranian regime, which itself frequently abuses the Palestinian cause to legitimise its regional policies. At the same time, history shows that the Palestinian struggle began decades before the creation of Iran’s regional proxies such as Hezbollah, and long before the Iranian Mullahs dictatorship itself. Nevertheless, public debate in many Western countries often frames the Palestinian cause primarily through accusations of antisemitism rather than through its historical and political roots. In this context, how do you interpret the phenomenon of many Iranians supporting Israel’s genocidal actions without educating themselves about the Palestinian cause and just as an emotional reaction towards the ruling radical, theological, brutal Iranian Authority?
Bahamad: To understand why some Iranians support Israel’s actions, one must analyse the psychological and political mechanisms of oppression within Iran:
Forced ideology in schools From childhood, the Iranian education system compels students to chant slogans such as “Death to this one or that one.” Children are required to participate in state-organised ceremonies and to trample flags with which they have no personal enmity. This forced ideological indoctrination, as well as the instrumental use of the Palestinian cause to legitimise a religious autocracy, has ultimately produced the opposite effect: namely, the development of rejection toward everything the regime presents as sacred.
Traumatic reaction rather than political analysis In many cases, the support of Israel by some Iranians is not a conscious endorsement of Zionism or the apartheid system, but rather a traumatic reaction and a form of political defiance against a regime that has destroyed their lives. The reductionist logic of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” is a product of a political climate of repression that has left society little room to engage with the historical and colonial contexts of the Palestinian struggle.
As queer-feminist antifascists, we reject this false dichotomy. We neither allow the Islamic Republic to appropriate the name of “resistance” to justify its own crimes, nor do we accept that the state of Israel whitewashes the violence and destruction in Gaza through “pinkwashing” strategies and appeals to democratic values. For us, the liberation of women in Tehran is inseparably linked to the liberation of people in Gaza or Afrin. True freedom does not arise from supporting one fascism to fight another, but through transnational solidarity of all oppressed bodies against militarism and colonial structures of domination.
etos.media: Finally, many Iranians feel they are trapped between two deeply problematic political alternatives: the authoritarian system of the Islamic Republic on the one hand, and the prospect of a return to monarchy on the other. In your view, how should politically conscious and educated Iranians view this situation? Do you see a realistic path forward that would allow Iran’s future to move beyond both of these options?
Bahamad: Many people in Iran today find themselves trapped between two authoritarian narratives—the Islamic Republic and the monarchy. Yet beneath the surface of society, some dynamics point toward an alternative path:
Culture of solidarity in small communities Contrary to the claim that Iran would fall apart without a “strong leader” (a king or religious figure), Iranian society is deeply familiar with the idea of small communities, neighbourhood ties, and local solidarity. Traditions of self-organisation demonstrate the potential of Iranian society to organise itself in small, independent structures. The way forward does not lie in waiting for a “saviour figure” abroad, but in strengthening the organizations that already exist today under the most difficult conditions: for example, the Coordinating Council of teachers’ unions, independent workers’ movements, local women’s networks in neighbourhoods, as well as civil society and community structures in regions such as Kurdistan and Balochistan. These initiatives form the seeds of a horizontal and democratic power structure.
From a queer-feminist and antifascist perspective, this third path means a consistent decentralisation of power. It is not about replacing one repressive centre with another. The future of Iran must instead be built on democratic federalism, social justice, and the recognition of all forms of diversity—ethnic, gender, and sexual. The way forward, therefore, means a transition from “saviour-centred individualism” to conscious collectivism. Political power must shift from palaces and religious centres of authority toward streets, factories, schools, and local community organisations. Only such a process can prevent the cycle of authoritarian rule from repeating itself.
Afsaneh: Many people in Iran are fed up with the lies and with seeing their country’s resources being used to kill others. Although I no longer live in Iran, I grew up there and know that most people share this opinion. The reality is that many people in Iran do not support the Islamic Republic, but they also do not want a return to the Monarchy. While these two factions are currently the dominant forces, we reject the idea that we must choose between them. We are tired of seeing power seized by force, only to have the same historical mistakes repeated again and again. We deserve a future that isn’t defined by the cycle of either regime.
Some closing remarks by the author
What has been unfolding in West Asia over the past few years is far from a minor development. The region that existed before this era may soon belong to history. Significant political and territorial transformations are taking place, reshaping borders and profoundly altering the living realities of millions of people—changes that would have seemed highly unlikely if discussed a few years ago.
The collapse of the Syrian regime and its long-standing one-party authority, the expansion of war toward the Gulf region, and the continuing expansion of the Israeli occupation—including in Syria, Lebanon, and on a daily basis inside “the Palestinian territories”—are rapidly creating new realities on the ground. These developments have unfolded with a speed and intensity that few political observers could have possibly anticipated. This period of dynamic change—described by some as a phase of regional, and in some respects even international, instability—leaves the region with very few clear or constructive options. Under such circumstances, the least that can be done is to avoid repeating the obvious mistakes of the past. History has already shown the consequences of authoritarian rule in its various forms, whether it presents itself wearing a turban or appearing in a suit with the shadow of a crown.
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