As Syria nears the first anniversary of Assad’s fall, Syria’s so-called “transitional period” is marked not by reform, but by fragmentation, sectarian violence, and deepening authoritarianism veiled in religious rhetoric. As minority communities like the Druze fight for survival amid state failure and regional power plays, the interim government in Damascus clings to power through repression, cronyism, and symbolic rule.
Since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 and the beginning of Syria’s so-called “transitional” period, the country has remained a fixture in international headlines, though rarely for positive reasons. What has emerged, unfortunately, is not a modern state but fragmented power, sectarian violence, extremist ideology, cronyism and weakened governance. Far from signalling genuine reform, this period feels like a detour into authoritarian theocracy. All signs point to a management strategy aimed at consolidating control, rather than institution-building. Syria is reverting to a darker era of authoritarian control, only soaked in religious doctrine rather than secular nationalism.
One recent example that reflects the collapse of centralised authority is the escalation in Suwayda, where sectarian allegiances have overtaken the state institutions, and minority communities are forced to govern their security. For the Druze population, what once was hesitant coexistence with Damascus has transformed into armed and strategic self-defence. Unless the de facto “transitional” authority demonstrates genuine inclusivity and commitment to national reconciliation, Syria would face the risk of further fragmentation and the loss of its territorial and social unity.
This article examines the most pressing developments in Syria at both the national and regional levels. It serves as an assessment of the actions and underlying intentions of the temporary de facto authority in Damascus, offering an early reading of this chaotic and turbulent post-Assad chapter.
The Internal Collapse: Fragmentation, Violence, and Authoritarianism
What happens when the fall of a dictatorship opens the door not to reform, but to a deeper, more fragmented authoritarianism, dominated by unchecked militias, ideological rigidity and symbolic governance? And was the promise of a “new Syria” ever anything more than a rebranding of the same authoritarian playbook?
Despite public ceremonies celebrating Syria’s newfound „national identity,“ the regime’s inability to control even a third of the country speaks volumes. Politically, economically, and socially, Damascus is less a governing body than an entity attempting to enforce its control through violence. The regime lacks the infrastructure to deliver essential services, the legitimacy to enforce law, and the political will to democratise or foster inclusivity. Core state functions like justice and education are either outsourced to local groups or abandoned altogether. The interim regime in Damascus, dominated by Islamist factions and led by a loosely formed coalition under Ahmed al-Sharaa, has failed to establish meaningful authority beyond pockets of urban areas. The de facto administration has entrenched itself in patterns that not only fail to break from the past but seem to be a rebranding of authoritarian rule.
Suwayda, a majority Druze province in southern Syria, has now become a hotbed of localised armed mobilisation and political estrangement. The violence that erupted this July, resulting in over a thousand casualties, most of them civilians, is not an isolated incident, but rather a symptom of a deeper, systemic collapse. Druze communities have now moved from passive resistance to active self-defence. The people of Suwayda – those who managed to survive – have reported harrowing accounts of atrocities committed by Bedouin factions aligned with militias backed by the religiously motivated interim government.
Video evidence has emerged showing homes completely burned, civilians brutally slaughtered without mercy, and innocent children, women, and elderly people humiliated and killed in unimaginably horrific ways. Another widely shared video features a young fighter involved in the Suwayda clashes, who openly admits that his group received direct support from both the government and the Ministry of Defence. In addition, numerous leaked audio recordings have surfaced, capturing government-affiliated individuals calling for a massacre in Suwayda, motivated by sectarian goals and aimed at extending government control through violence. While the interim government officially condemned the violence, its actions—or rather its inaction—raise troubling questions. It either failed to prevent this bloodshed due to a lack of capacity or, even worse, tolerated it as part of a broader sectarian strategy. The state’s inability to protect minority communities, coupled with its allowance of unchecked radical elements to operate freely, reflects not just incompetence but a dangerously misguided political approach. In this way, the de facto authorities undermine their own legitimacy and send a clear message to minorities: their security lies not with the state, but with themselves.
On July 18, a group of Syrian activists organised a peaceful sit-in protest outside the Syrian parliament to denounce the ongoing violence in Suwayda. The protest, however, was met with a violent response. The demonstrators were attacked both verbally and physically by individuals with sticks and bladed weapons. Among those assaulted was Zeina Shahla, a prominent journalist, cultural researcher, and former political detainee under the Assad regime. To date, the de facto government has not released any official statement addressing the incident.
The crimes in Suwayda were not an isolated incident. On June 22, a suicide bomber targeted the Mar Elias Greek Orthodox Church in Damascus during evening prayers, killing at least twenty people and injuring over sixty. The attacker opened fire inside the church before detonating an explosive vest. Authorities blamed an ISIS-linked sleeper cell, arresting suspects and claiming to have foiled a second planned attack. Although no group immediately claimed responsibility, a lesser-known extremist group, Saraya Ansar al-Sunna, later took credit, raising suspicions about broader extremist tolerance. The de facto government in Damascus failed to prevent the bombing, exposing both its security weaknesses and its tolerance of radical elements. Prior to this, reports of sectarian violence in Latakia and Tartous—particularly targeting Alawite families—revealed that thousands were massacred, and tens of thousands of Alawites reportedly fled to Lebanon, not just due to social pressure, but in response to direct threats, harassment, and property confiscations carried out by armed factions with alleged ties to the Ministry of Interior. While some claim these groups are rogue or linked to remnants of the former regime, credible reporting indicates that the de facto authorities bear primary responsibility for allowing—if not coordinating—these expulsions and other abuses. Meanwhile, unarmed, regime-aligned soldiers with no criminal records are being detained arbitrarily, while documented war criminals and businessmen closely connected to the former regime roam freely under political protection.
On another note, the government’s structure is slowly killing any hope for institutional reform. The interim constitution, signed on March 13 by interim president Ahmed al-Sharaa, grants him sweeping authority over all branches of government. While political parties—many of which were previously existing but largely hollow—were dissolved, there has been no introduction of a new legal framework to foster pluralism or representation. As a result, any genuine opposition to his rule is effectively stifled.
Economically, in both the Mount Hermon and Qassyoun areas, Syria’s de facto government is either allowing or possibly enabling wealthy local and foreign elites to exploit land and resources without proper legal oversight. Instead of rebuilding the economy transparently, powerful networks connected to the transitional authority are quietly taking control of valuable real estate and businesses. This informal economic activity benefits a small circle of elites while weakening state institutions and further fragmenting Syria’s already fragile economy. The outcome is a form of economic theft that undermines national sovereignty and prioritises private gain over public welfare.
In daily life, the climate of fear remains palpable. Syrians are still reluctant to speak to critical media outlets under their real names, and the few remaining journalists operate under severe restrictions. State media functions solely as an arm of government propaganda and has failed to gain public trust. This censorship echoes that of the previous regime. Meanwhile, cultural spaces, including cinemas and bars, face increasing harassment and closures. Al-Kindi Cinema, one of the oldest public cinemas still operating in Damascus, with a history reflecting multiple eras of Syrian culture, is facing closure after the Ministry of Religious Endowments ordered its shutdown and evacuation. The alleged plan is to convert the cinema into a religiously affiliated cultural centre. This decision was made without legal justification or prior notice, sparking widespread public outrage and protests. The move is widely seen as part of a broader government campaign to impose ideological control. Two days after the evacuation order, Jihad Abdo, actor and head of the General Organisation for Cinema, addressed the public, expressing that he had not been officially notified in advance. He voiced both surprise and disappointment over the decision, emphasising the importance of preserving Al-Kindi’s cultural significance. Rather than marking a new beginning, the transitional period now increasingly mirrors the previous regime’s control over public life, but this time under the guise of religion.
Syria on the Global Stage: Diplomatic Failures and Regional Tensions
How can the Syrian government claim sovereignty when foreign troops operate just kilometres from its capital? And what does it say about the government that celebrates symbols of power while losing control over its own land?
While internal conditions continue to deteriorate, the regional and international dynamics have further exposed the weaknesses and priorities of the de facto regime in Damascus. Israeli military operations have intensified in southern Syria, reaching areas alarmingly close to the capital. Detached from the realities of territorial loss, interim president Al-Sharaa has focused on symbolic displays such as state events and celebrations of national emblems. These acts serve more as political theatre than genuine acts of governance, suggesting that personal power outweighs the defence of sovereignty. Even the Israel-occupied Golan Heights, once central to Syrian national identity, is now largely absent from official discourse. Alarmingly, international negotiations have shifted towards enforcing the 1974 disengagement agreement, with little regard for the reclamation of the Golan Heights as a priority. Rumours and reports have also suggested potential plans for the resettlement of Palestinian refugees in Syria, raising concerns about future shifts in regional demographics and Syrian sovereignty. Although these reports remain unconfirmed, the unconditional acceptance of Israeli terms, without respect for Syria’s territorial integrity, makes such outcomes increasingly plausible.
On July 16, Israel launched a series of airstrikes targeting Syrian military sites, including the defence ministry headquarters, resulting in casualties and injuries. As usual, Israel justified this action by citing the need to protect minorities, this time claiming it was to safeguard the Syrian Druze in Suwayda—a claim that is remarkably easy to recognise as a falsehood. Israel framed the airstrikes as a humanitarian effort to prevent the government from attacking the Druze minority in the southern region. However, Israel’s involvement has only served to heighten tensions and deepen divisions within an already fragile society. The Druze community in Syria, particularly in Suwayda, is now enduring not only brutal violence but also harsh accusations of betrayal following Israel’s recent airstrikes on Damascus. Serious concerns were raised when the Syrian regime recently handed over the remains of Israeli spy Eli Cohen, who was publicly hanged in Damascus in May 1965, to Israel without any reciprocal arrangement, negotiation, or even a symbolic recognition of Syria’s national interests. This act was carried out in a secretive, uncompensated, and dismissive manner, showing a disregard for Syria’s legal and diplomatic standing. It signals the state’s weakness and its willingness to compromise on fundamental national issues without regard for historical responsibility or public accountability.
The Druze of Suwayda, in particular, feel betrayed by both their fellow Syrians and the government. Suwayda stood with the opposition during the revolution, fighting against Assad in the pursuit of a free and democratic Syria. The Druze also refused to join the Syrian military under Assad, even in the final years of his regime. In fact, Suwayda was the only Syrian city that continued to rebel and organise protests during Assad’s last years in power. Yet, despite this history of principled resistance, the Druze now find themselves facing accusations of betrayal—a painful reality that underscores the fragility of national unity in Syria’s ongoing crisis. The government in Damascus exposes its authoritarian and sectarian nature by vilifying minority communities like the Druze, revealing its deep hypocrisy, failure to foster national unity, and unwillingness to break from the repressive tactics of the Assad era. Rather than promoting inclusivity or reform, the regime prioritises control through exclusion and selective loyalty.
Simultaneously, international support for the transitional government, while vocal, remains largely symbolic. Most countries that claim to support al-Sharaa’s administration have not established formal diplomatic relations or meaningful aid frameworks. The much-publicised lifting of international sanctions proved ineffective on the ground, failing to bring real relief or investment and falling far short of expectations. Moreover, al-Sharaa’s diplomatic missteps, such as his refusal to shake hands with then German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock, highlight the administration’s inability to navigate international protocol, further isolating Syria and undermining its credibility on the global stage.
The regional and international landscape in Syria reveals a troubling pattern and raises serious questions about the government’s long-term intentions, capacity for reform, and willingness to protect the nation’s integrity and societal cohesion. The government’s inability or refusal to protect minority communities, address sectarian violence, or even prevent the illegal reshaping of Syria’s economy reflects a lack of capacity, credibility, and will for genuine reform.
This article was written with information available as of July 25, 2025.
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