Three months after the fall of the Assad regime, Syria stands at a precarious crossroads. As the initial euphoria fades, the new leadership faces mounting economic turmoil, an urgent need for political reform, and the weight of transitional justice. Will Syria’s fragile new government navigate these challenges to rebuild a stable, inclusive state – or will missteps plunge the nation into deeper chaos? This in-depth analysis breaks down the critical choices that will shape Syria’s future.
Note: This article is based on information, data,
and news available as of March 10, 2025.
It has been three months since the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria – a period too short to expect tangible results on the ground, but long enough for the initial wave of naïve euphoria to subside. It is also the right moment to begin asking critical questions and closely evaluating the first steps taken by the new Syrian authorities before the window for meaningful change starts to close.
This article outlines the key issues by which the success or failure of the new leadership will ultimately be judged, highlighting the factors that led Syria into its current crisis while also addressing the expectations and priorities of the Syrian people. For a deeper understanding of these topics within the broader political context, readers are encouraged to review our previous article on the Baath Party in Syria.
Sovereignty and security
A fundamental pillar for successfully rebuilding the Syrian state lies in reunifying the country under a single, centralized authority in Damascus, with one national army operating under the state’s command. Ensuring that only the state controls weapons through an organized military tasked with protecting all Syrians is essential for lasting stability – without this, any stability achieved would be fragile and temporary.
The complexity of this issue stems from the involvement of numerous actors. On the local level, this includes the SDF militias, which currently control a significant portion of Syrian territory. These areas, rich in natural resources, are critical to Syria’s economy, particularly its oil sector. Without regaining control over these resources, Syria’s oil reserves would be virtually nonexistent.
On March 10, 2025, Syria’s transitional president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, and the commander-in-chief of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), Mazloum Abdi, signed an agreement to integrate all civil and military institutions in northeastern Syria into the administration of the Syrian state. This includes key infrastructure such as border crossings, the airport, and oil and gas fields. If fully implemented, the agreement is expected to serve as a pivotal step toward reunifying Syria while safeguarding the rights of all citizens, preserving national sovereignty, consolidating the armed forces under Damascus’s command, and ensuring territorial integrity. There is widespread hope among Syrians that both sides will adhere to the agreement and put its provisions into action, particularly the unconditional integration of SDF fighters as individuals – rather than as a bloc – into the Syrian army under a unified central command in Damascus. The unity of the armed forces is seen as a non-negotiable sovereign issue and a fundamental prerequisite for any meaningful progress in the country.
While it is both fair and necessary to guarantee cultural rights, civil liberties, and equal citizenship for all Syrians in the new constitution, nevertheless, the idea of granting any armed faction, not just the SDF, any degree of independence in military decision-making is considered unacceptable. Such a scenario would effectively destroy the concept of a sovereign state and open the door for foreign powers to foster internal armed alliances, leaving Syria without real sovereignty. Numerous examples from Lebanon, Iraq, Libya, and Sudan demonstrate the dangers of such fragmented military structures. Proposing this model would amount to prematurely sabotaging Syria’s political transition.
Syria’s future must exist as a unified, sovereign state. Any proposals involving military divisions, armed factions operating outside state authority, or political power-sharing quotas based on identity must be categorically rejected. Syria cannot afford to become another Iraq or Lebanon. As Dr Azmi Bishara aptly put it in an interview about Syria’s future, “The rule must be that no one is excluded from political participation because of their identity – but no one should be guaranteed participation solely because of it.”
Another critical challenge for Syria’s next leadership will be asserting full control over all military factions, ensuring they operate strictly within the framework of a unified national army, and expelling any foreign fighters from Syrian soil. Factionalism is fundamentally incompatible with the professionalism and discipline required in a national military under state authority.
The recent bloodshed on the Syrian coast has starkly exposed the dangers of factionalism, highlighting Ahmad al-Sharaa’s inability to rein in those operating under his command. While the exact number of civilian casualties remains uncertain, most independent and reliable sources estimate the toll in the hundreds – surpassing the number of deaths among the remnants of the former Syrian regime. This can no longer be dismissed as a series of isolated mistakes but rather signals a systemic failure if armed factions remain unchecked in the region. An even graver concern would be if these actions were not merely the result of individual or structural shortcomings but were instead sanctioned by the state – a question only time will answer.
The extraordinarily high rate of so-called “individual violations” committed by some fighters – violations that can no longer be excused as isolated incidents – makes it clear that many of these individuals still view themselves as irregular militants rather than disciplined soldiers and displays a structural problem in the new armed forces. For instance, in the past, Syrian army officers were prohibited from displaying religious symbols, slogans, or affiliations of any kind. However, this principle eroded after Iranian elements became embedded in the army’s structure. Today, it appears the new military leadership disregards these protocols entirely, allowing soldiers to publicly display religious symbols and affiliations. This compromises the army’s image as a national institution and instead projects a sectarian identity – something that will severely hinder efforts to integrate all ethnic and religious groups into the future Syrian military.
In addition to internal challenges, Syria must also confront Israel’s expanding incursions into its territory. This may prove the most difficult task, given the Syrian state’s current extreme weakness – militarily, economically, and politically. Syria lacks the capacity to enforce the terms of the 1974 disengagement agreement, which Israel has repeatedly violated. In fact, Israel continues to establish military positions inside Syria, reinforcing them with infrastructure that signals its intention to maintain a long-term presence. This is part of a broader strategy to impose new conditions on previously signed agreements, exploiting Syria’s weakness and the international community’s passive acceptance of Israel’s violations – including occupation, killings, land seizures, and other breaches of international law.
Finally, safeguarding Syria’s sovereignty against all external actors – especially those involved in the country’s reconstruction or those who have long supported the current government, such as Turkey – is crucial. Preventing the formation of any armed groups outside the national military must also be non-negotiable. Preserving the state’s sovereignty and territorial integrity is a basic prerequisite for securing Syria’s independence and long-term stability.
Political transition
The question of political transition and the peaceful transfer of power is one of the most urgent and sensitive issues for Syrians, particularly given the burden of the Assad era. This makes it imperative for the current transitional authorities to handle the matter with extreme caution, as even the slightest miscalculation could create the perception of indifference, fueling fears that one authoritarian regime is merely being replaced by another. Given the gravity of this issue, every decision must be carefully studied, and no statements or actions should be taken unless they are well thought out, align with the needs of the moment, and reflect the aspirations of the Syrian people. While avoiding all mistakes is unrealistic, steering clear of avoidable and naive errors is essential. The most pragmatic approach is to examine democratic transition experiences in other countries, particularly those with similar demographic and cultural contexts. Even though many such transitions have failed, valuable lessons can still be drawn from those failures.
A key pillar of a successful democratic transition is the commitment of all factions to strengthening the state rather than fragmenting it. Political differences must be managed in a way that does not pose an existential threat to the country. However, this does not mean tolerating disastrous decisions merely to avoid conflict, as such an approach would lead to long-term consequences. Instead, all parties must remain aware of potential missteps, address them early, and avoid radical or extremist responses, particularly in a fragile phase where even minor instability could lead to state collapse.
This perspective aligns with insights from Palestinian intellectual Azmi Bishara, who has argued that while defining a theoretical framework for democratic transition is difficult due to the numerous influencing factors, the essential goal is to establish a clear vision and ensure state stability. Similarly, American political scientist Dankwart Rustow emphasized that national unity is a fundamental prerequisite for democracy, rather than economic or social conditions alone.
These ideas highlight the importance of human agency in democratic transitions, alongside structural factors such as economic and bureaucratic foundations. Syrians understand that building a bureaucratic state capable of supporting a pluralistic political system and elections is a long-term process. However, the absence of a clear, detailed plan with a specific timeline could lead to disastrous consequences. Delaying the presentation of such a plan – not just through scattered statements by individuals but as an official roadmap – is one of the most irresponsible actions the transitional government can take.
Over time, this delay risks provoking frustration among a public that has so far remained remarkably patient and responsible. One of the interim authorities’ most significant missteps has been their reliance on appointments rather than representation in shaping their vision for a democratic Syria. While political homogeneity may have been initially accepted as a necessary measure to prevent chaos, public dissatisfaction is likely to grow if key positions shaping the state’s future continue to be filled through appointments rather than democratic selection. The authorities argue, correctly, that Syria currently lacks the necessary infrastructure for democratic governance and that rushed elections could do more harm than good. However, this does not justify allowing appointed individuals – selected by a de facto authority – to make long-term decisions that will shape Syria’s political future. Instead, the interim government must focus on transitional governance and work toward forming representative bodies that genuinely reflect Syria’s diverse society, ensuring that both civil and secular opposition groups have meaningful participation.
The authorities in Damascus must urgently present a comprehensive and detailed political transition plan with a clear timeline. This plan should address bureaucratic and economic challenges while guaranteeing that all Syrians, both inside and outside the country, can participate in future elections under a transparent and accountable process. Moreover, the transitional government must recognize its temporary status and act accordingly, refraining from making long-term policy changes in sectors like education, where it lacks the legitimate authority to do so.
The National Dialogue Conference held on February 25, 2025, was assembled on short notice in an attempt to tackle Syria’s deeply complex issues in one day. The result was nothing more than a series of non-binding recommendations, leaving participants deeply disappointed. All existing political parties were dissolved, and the formation of new ones was prohibited – without introducing any alternative political parties act. Attendees were invited solely as individuals, excluding any meaningful representation of organized political parties or influential civil organizations. The entire process was rushed, and the final outcome failed to offer any binding solutions.
Transitional president Ahmed Al-Sharaa appointed a seven-member committee, including two women, to draft a constitutional declaration for Syria’s political transition. However, the draft was leaked just hours after its announcement, triggering widespread criticism. Many accused the process of being purely symbolic, with the constitution already pre-written. Controversial provisions included requiring the president to be Muslim and granting them authority to appoint parliament members. The draft also suspended party activities until a new political parties act is passed – raising concerns about the future of political pluralism in Syria.
Transitional justice
The aftermath of oppression under the previous regime has made transitional justice a highly sensitive issue in Syria, driven by public demand for accountability and justice. The widespread call to prosecute those responsible for past crimes is compounded by concerns over potential acts of personal revenge, which are difficult to control amid the ongoing instability and the absence of state authority in many regions. Despite the urgency and complexity of the issue, the current authorities have mishandled key aspects of the process. A significant misstep was the uncoordinated mass release of prisoners without proper identity verification or preemptive planning, followed by a failure to secure the prisons. This resulted in plundering official documents – potentially crucial evidence for future investigations – which could have played a pivotal role in holding perpetrators accountable.
Postponing the establishment of a structured, fair, and credible transitional justice process risks escalating crime rates, violence, and public frustration. Authorities in Damascus must strike a balance between ensuring justice for war criminals from the previous regime and preserving national stability. This requires a rational approach that avoids emotionally driven or retaliatory measures, particularly against all those who worked in state institutions under the Baath Party. A well-executed process would protect the rights of the Syrian people while preventing a bureaucratic collapse and further disorder.
Additionally, accountability should not be limited to the former regime’s crimes. The atrocities committed by foreign fighters who joined armed Islamist opposition groups – often driven by radical ideologies rather than any genuine interest in Syria’s freedom – must also be addressed. These individuals should be prosecuted and deported, with their past and ongoing crimes acknowledged rather than dismissed as mere “individual mistakes.”
The recent massacre of civilians along the Syrian coast underscores the critical need for transitional justice, which should not be confined to former regime officials. A significant number of soldiers within the current Syrian armed forces have committed acts that amount to state terror. If transitional authorities fail to take decisive action – holding undisciplined armed factions accountable and ensuring justice for victims in a way that demonstrates no one is above the law – their promises for the future will ring hollow. A comprehensive approach to justice, addressing crimes committed by both the former regime and Islamist militants within the restructured Syrian military, is essential to preventing future unrest driven by hatred and a desire for revenge.
Civil rights
Syria has long been considered relatively secular since gaining independence, as long as civil rights remained separate from political influence. The country never enforced compulsory hijab or imposed strict Islamic laws on issues such as freedom of dress, belief, or daily life, including food consumption and gender segregation in schools or universities. Many Syrians are determined to uphold and even enhance these freedoms, but achieving this goal now appears to be an increasingly difficult challenge. Given the current political climate and the religious leanings of Syria’s new leadership, any significant progress in civil rights seems unrealistic. As a result, Syrians are now primarily focused on preserving the civil liberties that previously existed rather than expanding them.
Following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s brutal regime, many Syrians feared that Damascus would face the same fate as areas previously controlled by Islamist factions, where civil liberties were severely restricted, and Sharia law was enforced. While such measures have not yet been implemented at the state level, concerns remain. A significant reminder came when Syria’s transitional president Ahmed al-Sharaa did not shake hands with German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock. This moment served as a wake-up call for those who had underestimated the potential threats to civil rights and sought to justify the new government’s reactionary policies. Reports of individuals being arrested for “blasphemy” and sectarian revenge crimes occurring at an alarming rate – especially in cities like Homs, Latakia and Tartous – have further fueled these fears. On an official level, the state has also taken steps toward the Islamization of Syria, making decisions that many view as reckless and deeply provocative.
One of the most controversial moves was the removal of the evolution theory from Syrian school curricula, eliminating a fundamental scientific concept from education. In addition, authorities reinstated “Religion” as a mandatory subject for the baccalaureate (A levels, Abitur) exams, reversing decades of its diminished role in the educational system. Beyond these changes, the government has erased historical references to Syria’s Canaanite and Aramaic heritage, removed terms like “Goddess,” and even stopped teaching the history of Queen Zenobia – considering her a fictional character. These alterations have sparked outrage, particularly among intellectuals, who see them as reactionary, ignorant, and potentially dangerous manipulations of the education system.
In a recent move that ignited widespread controversy, the director of Religious Endowments in Damascus, Samer Birkdar, submitted an official request to the Minister of Religious Endowments, proposing issuing a directive mandating all public and private institutions to uphold the sanctity of Ramadan by prohibiting public eating during the holy month. This proposal was met with strong opposition from many Syrians, who viewed it as a violation of personal freedoms and a step toward enforcing religious practices through state authority.
Those who defend these decisions by arguing that it is too early to judge or that civil rights remain intact may underestimate the critical role education plays in shaping Syria’s future. They may also fail to recognize that the government’s current apparent “tolerance” may not stem from a genuine commitment to civil rights but rather from an awareness of Syria’s fragile state. The authorities, for now, may simply be avoiding drastic changes to prevent civil unrest. The threat of further, more extreme changes remains a pressing concern. To prevent this, an action plan must be developed urgently – one that peacefully protects civil rights while ensuring the stability of the state.
Journalism (4th estate)
Under Assad’s rule, Syria was one of the most dangerous countries in the world for journalists. For decades, the state imposed severe restrictions on the press, only granting work permits to media outlets that aligned with government propaganda. Even online, authorities closely monitored individuals suspected of disloyalty to the regime. Many journalists faced arrest and torture, while Syria consistently ranked among the deadliest countries for journalists. This long history of repression and state control made press freedom a top priority for the Syrian people and a key measure by which the current leadership is being evaluated. However, despite expectations for progress, the new authorities in Syria have yet to demonstrate a meaningful commitment to independent journalism. While there has been a slight increase in the ability to publish and express opinions in various media, this shift appears to stem more from the state’s overall weakness than from a genuine policy supporting press freedom. There is no clear indication that the leadership in Damascus views an independent press as a fundamental right that must be protected.
Reports indicate that the current Syrian government still requires journalists to obtain work permits. Even with these permits, many are unable to operate freely, as several regions remain under the de facto control of local authorities who do not always adhere to directives from Damascus. Journalists who work for media outlets aligned with the transitional president al-Sharaa can operate without restrictions, but those involved in critical or investigative reporting must exercise extreme caution to ensure their safety. Many journalists in Syria continue to use pseudonyms or avoid showing their faces when working with organizations that do not fully support the new government.
Beyond these challenges, a major gap in official communication between the state and the public remains. With no clear government narrative, Syrians are often left to rely on leaks, unverified reports, and unreliable sources. A simple solution to this issue would be the appointment of an official spokesperson to provide regular updates and answer questions from independent journalists on a daily or weekly basis. However, even such a basic reform has yet to be implemented, raising doubts about the administration’s commitment to transparency and reform. A truly independent fourth estate, free from government control and restrictions, is essential for Syria’s transition. Unfortunately, to date, no serious structural reforms have been undertaken to guarantee press freedom in the country.
The economy
The economic crisis in Syria stands as one of the most pressing issues, affecting millions who face unprecedented levels of poverty and unemployment. Basic necessities, including energy sources, public services, and electricity, remain scarce, while the soaring prices of goods far exceed the average salary, making daily survival a struggle. Although Syria’s economy has never been in a worse state than it has been since 2011, the crisis has far deeper and more complex roots than mere sanctions and blockades, with origins that stretch back long before the current turmoil.
Addressing Syria’s severe economic crisis without thoroughly analyzing the government’s past decisions would be irresponsible, yielding no practical or effective solutions. Reducing the crisis to broad terms like “sanctions,” “war,” and “corruption” – though undeniably influential – oversimplifies the situation, disregards deeper complexities, and ultimately shifts responsibility away from those accountable.
Given the complexities and challenges of the ongoing crisis in Syria, it is understandable that an immediate resolution may not be feasible. However, it is crucial for the current authorities to implement a clear and effective plan that ensures progress in the medium term. Stabilizing the economy remains a fundamental step in addressing broader issues and preventing potential public unrest with unpredictable consequences.
This chapter provides an overview of key economic shifts in Syria since it gained independence from French colonial rule, aiming to shed light on the various factors that led Syria to its disastrous current economic situation. After gaining independence, Syria’s economy relied primarily on agriculture, with light industry playing a smaller role. Investment in social services was minimal, except in the education sector, while military spending increased significantly following the 1948 Palestinian Nakba. This fragile and developing economy faced considerable challenges in a newly independent nation that had become a battleground for local, regional, and global ideological and political conflicts.
During this period, Syria faced a highly uncertain and tense political climate, grappling with multiple crises and conflicts. Tensions between the civil authority and the military, along with the broader ideological struggle between the East and West, had an early and significant impact on the country. These challenges were compounded by various local issues, all unfolding within an economy too fragile to withstand the instability and weakness of the state. This turmoil played a crucial role in accelerating the push for unity and accepting Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser’s terms, including the dissolution of Syria’s numerous political parties, which had flourished during the nation’s democratic phase. At the time, the economic conditions created a sense that Syria’s very survival was at risk without a strong state, making the formation of the United Arab Republic (UAR) with Nasser appear as a potential solution for stabilizing both the country and its economy.
The United Arab Republic (UAR) lasted only three years (1958–61), largely due to the concentration of power in Egypt and Syria’s near-unconditional acceptance of the union, along with various political factors beyond the scope of this article. Additionally, Syria’s complex and highly diverse society contrasted sharply with Egypt’s more homogeneous social structure, further complicating the union. These challenges ultimately led to the UAR’s dissolution just three years after its formation. However, despite its short lifespan, the UAR era played a crucial role in shaping Syria’s economy and state for years to come.
During the era of the United Arab Republic (UAR), Syria underwent significant economic changes, including nationalization, land reform, and a land distribution policy implemented by Nasser. Many of these drastic reforms remained in place even after the Baath Party took power, as reversing them could have allowed the rise of an economically powerful class that might challenge the party’s authority. Additionally, maintaining these policies helped secure support from rural areas. However, the economic uncertainty of the time led many Syrian elites to transfer their wealth to Lebanese banks, attracted by Lebanon’s liberal economy and strict banking privacy. This capital flight made Lebanon a crucial economic outlet for Syria, a factor that later played a role in Syria’s long-standing intervention in Lebanon, which became even more essential as Western sanctions began to take a toll on the Syrian economy.
In the 1970s, following Hafez al-Assad’s coup against Salah Jadid, Assad consolidated power through a combination of fear and the ruthless control exerted by his security apparatus. His prolonged rule, lasting three decades, was also facilitated by pragmatic economic concessions when necessary and the absence of a rigid ideological framework, allowing him to manipulate economic policies to reinforce his authoritarian grip. During this period, Syria received significant financial support from the Gulf countries, particularly in the wake of the 1973 October War, which temporarily revitalized the economy.
The 1980s, however, marked a period of severe economic crisis. The cessation of Gulf financial aid, rampant corruption, and the failure to achieve sustainable economic development weakened Syria’s economic foundations. The regime restricted economic participation to a select elite operating within controlled circles of corruption, ensuring that no independent economic force could emerge as a political threat. This economic decline coincided with an escalating conflict against the Muslim Brotherhood, further straining the country’s stability.
As economic hardship deepened, merchants in key cities such as Aleppo, Hama, and Damascus began planning strikes. The regime’s response was particularly brutal in Hama, a stronghold of the Muslim Brotherhood, where it launched one of the most horrific massacres in Syrian history. Tens of thousands of residents, including civilians unconnected to the Brotherhood, were killed indiscriminately. Estimates place the death toll between 20,000 and 40,000. The massacre left a lasting impression on Syrians, serving as a stark warning of the regime’s response to any future uprisings.
By the 1990s, Syria’s economy began to recover due to several key factors. The discovery and export of additional oil reserves provided a financial boost while Syria’s participation in the Gulf War on the side of the U.S.-led coalition brought financial aid from Western and Gulf nations. Additionally, tensions with Iraq and the collapse of the Soviet Union influenced Syria’s decision to align with the international coalition, securing economic and political benefits. With its control over Lebanon firmly established at the time, the Syrian regime felt little urgency to pursue structural economic reforms.
However, by 1996, oil revenues declined significantly, and when Bashar al-Assad inherited power after his father’s death, he initiated a process of economic liberalization that weakened the public sector. State subsidies were reduced, and a private sector closely tied to the regime was established, leading to rising unemployment and the erosion of the Baath Party’s rural support base. The 2005 withdrawal from Lebanon further worsened Syria’s economic difficulties.
The outbreak of the 2011 revolution and the regime’s violent suppression of protests plunged the country into a prolonged war, accelerating economic decline. Mass displacement, the regime’s mounting war expenses, and growing debts to its allies further destabilized Syria. Additionally, losing control over the oil-rich northeastern region deprived the government of a critical revenue source. In an attempt to compensate, the regime turned to a war economy based on smuggling and drug trafficking. However, its inability to fully control corruption networks and criminal enterprises limited the effectiveness of this strategy.
When evaluating Syria’s economic struggles, it is crucial not to exaggerate or downplay the role of Western sanctions. Unlike the nearly total economic blockade imposed on Iraq in the past, Syria was still able to engage in trade with nations that did not participate in the sanctions. While the economic penalties undoubtedly had devastating effects, attributing Syria’s economic collapse solely to these measures would be an oversimplification of a much broader structural crisis. Understanding Syria’s economic history raises an essential question for the current leadership:
What is the long-term strategy for building a strong state with a sustainable economy, backed by modern infrastructure that can ensure lasting prosperity?
The answer must come from expert economic planners and policymakers – not from illiterate jihadists making empty promises or short-sighted leaders relying on foreign aid without a comprehensive strategy to address the root causes of the crisis.
In conclusion, it is clear to everyone that the challenges are immense and the road ahead is anything but easy. However, delays in action, a lack of genuine commitment to thorough planning, and the constant tendency to blame the chaos left by the previous regime will not lay the foundation for a stable future. The initial patience born out of post-regime euphoria will not last indefinitely. If the new Syrian authorities continue to fall short in offering clear answers and presenting credible, concrete work plans across all sectors, the consequences could be severe – bringing Syrians back to a reality they had briefly believed was behind them.
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